Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age (2018) by Waldman, Ari Ezra
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Books
2018
Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an
Information Age (2018)
Ari Ezra Waldman
New York Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_books
Part of the Privacy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Books by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Waldman, Ari Ezra, "Privacy as Trust: Information Privacy for an Information Age (2018)" (2018). Books. 54.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_books/54
Privacy as Trust 
INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE 
ARI EZRA WALDMAN 
New York Law School 
N .. -:vv '{: ,'·\~\ 
APR 1 0 2018 
L/\VJ SC!, OOL 
B CAMBRIDGE 
~ UNIVERSITY PRESS 
(L. 
3l-lo4 
C..<..$" 
W\$'" 
:z..o •e 
c...,a. 
CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom 
One Liberty Plaza, 2oth Floor, New York, NY 10oo6, USA 
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 
314-321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, 
New Delhi - 110025, India 
79 Anson Road, #o6-o-f/o6, Singapore 079906 
Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. 
It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of 
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence. 
www.cambridge.org 
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107186oo2 
DOl: 10.1017/9781316888667 
© Ari Ezra Waldman 2018 
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception 
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, 
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written 
permission of Cambridge University Press. 
First published 2018 
Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books, Inc. 
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library. 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
NAMES: Waldman, Ari Ezra, 198o-, author. 
TITLE: Privacy as trust : information privacy for an information age I Ari Ezra Waldman. 
DESCRIPTION: New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018.1 Includes bibliographical 
references and index. 
IDENTIFIERS: LCCN 20170614471 ISBN 9781107186002 (hardback) 
SUBJECTS: LCSH: Data protection- Law and legislation. I Privacy, Right of. I 
Confidential communications. I Personality (Law). 
CLASSIFICATION: LCC K3264.c65 w 35 20181 DDC 323.44i~c23 
LC record available at https:/l1ccn.loc.govho1706J.447 
ISBN 978-1-107-186oo-2 Hardback 
ISBN 978-1-316-63694-7 Paperback 
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of 
URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication 
and docs not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, 
accurate or appropriate. 
For my family: always loving, always there. 
VIII Contents 
9 Information Flow in Intellectual Property 
10 Trust and Robots 
Notes 
Index 
Conclusion: The Future of Privacy and Trust 
122 
134 
Introduction 
What's at Stake? 
In May 2016, several Danish researchers released data on 7o,ooo users of the 
· elating website OKCupicl. Those of us who have tried online dating know that 
profiles on OKCupid (or Match, JDate, or eHarmony) are rich in sensitive 
personal information. The researchers published much of it: usernames, age, 
gender, and location, as well as sexual orientation, fetishes, religious views, 
and more. G iven the breadth of that information, it wouldn't take much to 
figure out the identities of those involved. And the researchers neither 
obtained consent nor anonymizecl the data.' 
This data clump posed a privacy puzzle. OKCupid users voluntarily answer 
hundreds of questions about themselves so the website can use an algorithm to 
connect them with supposedly compatible matches. The answers are available 
to all OKCupiclmembers, with some basic information ava ilable to nonmem-
bers via a Coogle search of a person's name. For these reasons, while they may 
have violated OKCupid's terms of use and ethical canons for research in the 
social sciences, the researchers felt they were on solid privacy grounds. They 
did not need to anonymize the data set, they sa id, because users had provided 
the information in the first place and other people had already seen it. By any 
traditional metric, they thought, this information was not private! 
Notably, this wasn't an isolated incident. Researchers have mined personal 
data before. 3 Retailers do it all the time, gathering everything from our 
browsing histories to Facebook "likes" to target us with advertisements they 
think we want to see. Coogle tailors its search results based on what it learns 
from our behavior across platforms, sometimes discriminating against us in 
the process.4 Data brokers amass vast collections of information about us 
gleaned from across the Web and sell it to the highest bidder. Facebook is 
steaming ahead with frighteningly accurate facial recognition technology 
based on the millions of photos we upload for our friencls.5 Retailers analyze 
our purchasing h istories to predict what we will buy next even before we know 
2 Introduction: What's at Stake? 
it ourselves.6 And marketers are using our buying patterns and CPS 
technology to send sale notifications directly to our phones when we pass 
a brick-and-mortar store.? 
We have a choice. Our society is at a crossroads. We can live in a world 
where these activities go on unabated, where stepping outside our homes and 
using technology are information-sharing events, where the law cannot protect 
us, and where the only things tl1at are truly private are tl1e things we keep 
secret. In this world, anyone, whether they are overeager researchers or online 
advertisers, can use our data because, as a matter oflaw and social practice, the 
information is already public. We share our data the moment we sign up for an 
account, or browse the Internet, or buy a book online.8 In this world, privacy is 
dead. 
Or, we could live in a world where privacy still matters. In this less 
totalitarian, more agreeable world, lawyers, judges, policymakers, teachers, 
students, parents, and technology companies take privacy seriously. Here, 
privacy has a fighting chance against other values and norms, and information 
can be shared with others without the entire world looking on. 
Today, we seem closer to privacy's death tl1an to its renaissance. Indeed, 
talking heads have been writing privacy's obituary for years.9 That is in part 
because, like the Danish researchers who took a cavalier approach to their 
subjects' privacy, we have been thinking about privacy too narrowly. 
Strengthening privacy won't be easy, but getting to a better world starts with 
changing the way we think about privacy, how we integrate and manage it in 
our daily lives, and how the law is used to protect it. And that is what this book 
is about: I want to change the way we think about privacy so we can better 
leverage law to protect it in a modern world. 
We are accustomed to conceptualizing privacy in certain ways. We often 
think that privacy is about separating from the prying eyes of others or keeping 
things secret; that's why we draw blinds when we don't want people looking in. 
Sometimes we associate privacy with certain spaces or property boundaries; 
what we do "in the privacy of our own homes" or "behind closed doors" or in 
our bedrooms and bathrooms, for example, is our business. Sometimes we 
think privacy is bound up with intimacy; that's what makes topics like sex, 
money, and medical care inherently personal. But I argue that limiting our 
understanding of privacy to these concepts alone is what allows our data to be 
mined and used with impunity. These ways of understanding privacy are, at 
best, incomplete and, at worst, hurtling us toward a dystopian future designed 
without privacy in mind. 
For example, thinking tl1at privacy is synonymous with secrecy could help 
us when someone hacks our personal network and publishes previously 
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encrypted files, but it doesn't offer much consolation for users of OKCupid 
or for a victim of nonconsensual pornography who shared images with 
a now-ex-boyfri end only to have him upload those pictures to Pornhub. 
Once we share something, it's no longer secret, and we lose control of i t. 10 
Similarly, it may be sufficient for a homeowner who notices a drone-
mounted camera by her window to th ink about privacy as bound up with 
enclosed spaces or property lines, but it would be radically insufficient the 
moment she stepped outside. And although some of these victims could fall 
back on the inherent intimacy of the information revealed to explain their 
feeling that their privacy was invaded, privacy-as-intimacy cannot, on its 
own, respond to the transfer of personal data among websites, behaviorally 
targeted advertisem ents, and "big data" p redictive analytics that mine see-
mingly innocuous and nonintimate information from across the Internet to 
determine what we see, what we buy, and what we learn. 
We need to change our perspective on privacy. 
It may sound strange, but privacy is an inherently social concept. The very 
idea of privacy presumes that we exist in botl1 formal and informal relation-
ships witl1 others: p rivacy only matters after we share within those relation-
ships. When making sharing decisions, we rely on and develop expectations 
about what should happen to our information based on the contexts in which 
we share, thus integrating privacy into our lives relative to other people." 
As the law professor Robert Post describes, privacy norms "rest[] not upon 
a perceived opposi tion between persons and social life, but rather upon their 
interdependence."'2 Privacy, then, is socially situated . It is not a way to witl1-
draw or to limi t our connection to others. It is, at its core, about the social 
relationships governing disclosure between and among individuals and 
between users and the platforms tl1at collect, analyze, and manipulate their 
information for some purpose.'3 
For example, when we share the fact that we are HIV-positive with the 100 
members of an HIV support community, we may expect a far greater degree of 
confidentiality and discretion from tl1em than from two acquaintances at 
work. When we whisper secrets to a good friend, we expect confidentiality 
even without a written agreement. We share our bank account numbers with 
Bank of America's website and expect tl1at it won't be shared with online 
marketers. And al though we may recognize that using the Internet or joining 
a discount loyalty program requires some disclosure, we share our information 
with the expectation that it will be used for the specific purpose for which we 
shared it. What we share, witl1 whom we share it, and how we share it matter. 
In other words, someiliing about the social context of disclosure is the key to 
determining what is private and what is not.'4 
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That key is trust. Trust is a resource of social capital between or among two 
or more parties concerning the expectation that others will behave according 
to accepted norms. It mitigates the vulnerability and power imbalance inher-
ent in disclosure, allowing sharing to occur in the first place. Put another way, 
disclosures happen in contexts of trust, and trust is what's broken when data 
collection and use go too far. An information age demands an understand ing 
of information privacy that recognizes that we share a substantial amount of 
personal data with friends, public and private insti tutions, websites, and online 
advertisers. More generally, a doctrine of information privacy must navigate 
the public/private divide in context, recognizing, among other things, that 
what we share, when we share, why we share, and with whom we share matter 
for determining whether disclosed information is still legally protectable as 
private.'5 And it must not only explain what we consider private, but also why 
certain things fall into the private sphere and why other things do not.'6 This 
theory must also refl ect how information privacy is implemented on the 
ground, including how we determine when and what to share, how platforms 
manipulate us into disclosing more than we might otherwise have wanted, and 
how, if at all, technology companies embed privacy norms in the data-hungry 
products they create. And the theory must be administrable, capable of being 
applied by lawyers and judges in real cases to answer real information privacy 
questions. Finally, the way we think about privacy has to set us on a better path, 
one that not only helps privacy thrive in a modern world, but also has positive 
effects on society as a whole. 
Because we share when we trust, I argue that we should start talking about, 
thinking through, and operationalizing information privacy as a social norm 
based on trust. In the context of information sharing, trust gives us the ability to 
live with and minimize the vulnerability inherent in sharing by relying on 
expectations of confidentiality and discretion. Indeed, all disclosures create 
vulnerability and imbalances of power. Elsewhere, as in doctor-patient or 
attorney-cl ient relationships, where significant disclosures create similar 
power imbalances, we manage those risks with strong trust norms and power-
ful legal tools that protect and repair disclosure relationships. Reinvigorating 
information privacy requires similar norms and legal weapons, as well. So, 
when we share information with others in contexts of trust, that information 
should be protected as private. I call this argument privacy-as-trust, and, like 
other trust doctrines in the law, it allows disclosure to occur in safe environ-
ments buttressed by concurrent norms of confidentiality and discretion. 
By the end of this book, my hope is that we will start considering trust as an 
important part of our notion of information privacy. More specifically, my goal 
is to argue that we should conceptualize information privacy in terms of 
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relationships of trust and leverage law to protect those relationships. This, 
however, does not mean that all other visions of privacy are useless. Important 
rights-based concepts of privacy are not wrong; they are just incomplete. 
On their own, they have difficulty answering some modern privacy questions 
posed by new tech nologies like predictive analytics, social robots, and ongoing 
and pervasive data collection. Privacy-as-trust can help get us on the path to 
a better world where privacy not only exists, but thrives, and where society 
benefits from a rejuvenation and strengthening of trust norms among indivi-
duals and between individuals and data collectors . 
It is also important to note what this book is not about. Privacy takes on 
many forms, in different contexts, with a variety of bogeymen ready to break or 
erode it. T his project is about information privacy, generally, and privacy in 
times of disclosure, specifically. It is primarily about the ways in which we 
interact and share information with, and are vulnerable to, other private 
actors - other individuals and technology companies, for example - rather 
than government agents. That is not to say that conceptualizing privacy as 
based on relationships of trust is necessarily silent or unhelpful in a variety of 
contexts. But those extrapolations and extensions are for another book. 
I construct my argument in three stages. Part I is about where we have been; 
it develops and then critiques the many theories of privacy that dominate 
current privacy scholarship, showing how each of them is a variant on the 
same theme and has helped bring us to where we are today. Part II is about the 
theory of privacy-as-trust itself; it teases out the definition of trust, provides 
empirical evidence in support of the relationship between trust and disclosure, 
and shows how privacy-as-trust is already being operationalized on the ground. 
It argues that trust must be part of our understanding of privacy, as a result. Part 
III is about the better world with trust in it. I apply privacy-as-trust to several 
vexing questions of privacy and information law, and show the contrast 
between conventional and trust-based approaches. In all cases, understanding 
privacy as bound up with the concept of trust brings about a better, more just 
world where privacy is a strong social value. 
PART I: WHAT DO WE MEA BY "PRIVACY"? 
For many, privacy is about choice, autonomy, and ind ividual freedom . 
It encompasses the individual's right to determine what she will keep hidden 
and what, how, when, and to whom she will disclose personal information. 
Privacy is her respite from the prying, conformist eyes of the rest of the world 
and her expectation that things about herself she wants to keep private will 
remain so. I will call these ideas the rights conceptions of privacy to evoke their 
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Lockean and Kantian foundations. And they can be divided into two cate-
gories. In Chapter 1, I discuss the definitions of privacy that are based on 
negative rights, or those that see the private sphere as a place o~ freedom ~om 
something. These notions of privacy include elemen.ts of secl~s1on a~d pnv~te 
spaces, as well as conceptions based on the sanctity of pnvate thmgs, ~1ke 
discrediting secrets or intimate information. Common to these ways of thi~1k­
ing about privacy is an element of separation, suggesting that they pr~v1de 
freedom from the public eye. Chapter 2 discusses the second category of ngl:ts-
based definitions of privacy. These conceptualizations retain the assumptwn 
of separation, but use it for a different purpose - namely, for the opportu~1ity to 
grow, develop, and realize our full p~te~tial as fre~ persons. It conceives ~; 
privacy as affirmatively for the full realization of the hberal,.autonomou~ self. 
The rights conceptions of privacy pervade privacy rhetonc, s~holarsh1p, and 
judicial decisions. They are the dominant ways we a1~proach pnva~y proble.ms 
today. They are, however, incomplete. They miss the fact that mforma.twn 
privacy norms are triggered by disclosure. And disclosure i.s an ess~nbally 
social behavior: once we share, we trade control of our mformabon for 
reliance on powerful social norms, or background social rules that feed. into 
our expectations of what should happen with our personal data . Pnvacy 
centered solely on the individual ignores those social norms even thou~h 
they are not only essential to sharing but have positive effects on social 
solidarity. Without them, we risk narrowing privacy into oblivion. 
Like the work of Robert Merton,'8 Michel Foucault,'9 H elen 
Nissenbaum,20 and others, privacy-as-trust approaches information privacy 
and disclosure from a social perspective. Privacy-as-trust recognizes that infor-
mation privacy is not about excluding others, but rather about regula~ing the 
flow of information to some, restricting it from some, and openmg Jt up to 
others. This essential understanding about privacy's social role is not new, and 
Chapter 3 focuses on describing the development of social theories of privacy 
over the last 50 years. In that chapter, I argue that social theories o~ privacy ~o 
date may have recognized that privacy is what manages infon~abon flow ~n 
context, but they inadequately respond to the power dynamics at play 111 
disclosure. That is the role of trust. 
PART II: TRUST AND PRIVACY 
Disclosure and privacy govern our relationships with others (persons as well as 
technology platforms); as such, they are social phenomena. Trust is the link 
between them . And strong trust norms are what allow sharing and social 
interaction to occur." 
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Particular social trust is the "favourable expectation regarding other peo-
ple's actions and intentions," or the belief that others will behave in 
a predictable manner." It "begins where knowledge ends"2 3 and is the mutual 
"faithfulness" on which all social interaction depends."'~ For example, when 
an individual speaks with relative strangers in a support group like Alcoholics 
~nonymous, she trusts that they will not divulge her secrets. Trust, therefore, 
mcludes a willingness to accept some risk and vulnerability toward others and 
steps in to grease the wheels of social activity!5 I cannot know for certain that 
my fellow support group members will keep my confidences, so trust allows 
me to interact with them, disclose information, and rely on discretion with 
confidence. And I earn all sorts of positive rewards as a result!6 
It makes sense, then, to turn to trust when thinking about what motivates us 
to share personal information online and what governs the related privacy 
norms in social interaction: Alice shares information with Brady because Alice 
tr.usts Brady with that information; the applicable norms - confidentiali ty and 
discretion - give Alice the confidence and comfort to share with Brady, 
mitigating the vulnerability inherent in someone else having access to her 
home. The same mechanism is at play when we share information with 
~~wyers, doctors, and financial planners: strong trust norms, backed by tradi-
Ion, professional standards, and the law, give us th e confidence and comfort to 
share. Despite the intuitive appeal of that mechanism, particular social trust 
h.as been, at best, a silent undercurrent in a growing literature on our propen-
Sity to disclose personal information. Part II of this book teases out this privacy, 
sharing, and trust relationship. 
The theory of privacy-as-trust is the subject of Chapters 4 and 5· Privacy-as-
trust posits that information disclosed in contexts defined by trust should be 
legal~y protected as private. It is not an attempt at a unitary, a priori defi nition 
of pnvacy that applies to all situations!7 But privacy-as-trust does give us a way 
of understanding how private disclosure contexts vary from context to context 
~nd why certain uses of data strike us as invasive and unfair. Thinking about 
mformation privacy as based on relationships of trust means several things. 
It m~ans seeing privacy as something that can fos ter disclosure by mitigating 
the .nsks inherent in disclosure and rebalancing power between sharers and 
audiences. It means looking at the context of disclosure to determine the 
difference between public and private information. It means considering both 
norms at the time of disclosure and any background that has an impact on 
future expectations. And it means asking how the law can be used to 
~trengthen relationships of trust between parties and equalizing the power 
un~alances that come with sharing. Doing this will have significant value to 
SOCiety. 
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Chapter 4 also offers som e evidence that privacy-as-trust reflects how we 
operationalize privacy and disclosure decisions in practice. An empirical study 
ofFacebook users, summarized here, suggests that trust is a key factor in users' 
decisions to share personal information on the platform. And, as scholars have 
shown, many companies with strong privacy leaders at the top think about 
their privacy obligations as protecting and fostering trust between the com-
pany and its customers.'8 Therefore, if trust is defining our understanding of 
privacy on the ground , perhaps the law and privacy theory can catch up. 
PART III: PRIVACY-AS-TRUST IN ACTION 
The balance of the book considers what information privacy law would look 
like if we applied privacy-as-trust to several ongoing privacy and information 
law controversies. There are five chapters in this section, each of which uses 
case studies to show how a privacy law regime based on trust would look 
different than the status quo. In each case, some amount of disclosure causes 
risk, vulnerability, and a loss of power; privacy-as-trust restores the trust norms 
that protect those disclosures in the first place. 
Chapter 6 starts at the macro level, considering Internet platforms' obliga-
tions and responsibilities. The current regime, which requires data collectors 
do little more than provide us with notice of what information data they collect 
and what they do with it after collection, is based on the idea, discussed in 
Chapter 2, that privacy is about the freedom to choose when and how to 
disclose personal information. As many scholars have argued, however, this 
"notice-and-choice" approach is hopelessly flawed and inadequate. It gives 
users little to no help when making disclosure decisions, and it offers even less 
protection when Internet companies use our data in unexpected and invasive 
ways. This is especially problematic where web platforms use artificial intelli-
gence (AI) or complex algorithms to learn about us, predict the things we want 
to see, and mediate our online experiences. A reorientation of privacy law 
around principles of trust would address these gaps, providing the necessary 
theoretical justification for holding data collectors to certain fiduciary respon-
sibilities of loyalty. As the legal scholars Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, and 
others have argued, this would protect us from Internet platforms that are 
already inducing our trust, taking our data, and harming us for their own 
profit. 
Chapter 7 goes from macro to micro, applying privacy-as-trust to several 
cases about the wide dissemination of information previously disclosed under 
limited circumstances. These cases apply the current privacy torts, including 
intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts, which require 
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judges to determine the difference between public and private information. 
But when judges, as many do today, define privacy as synonymous with 
secrecy, victims of privacy invasions are left out in the cold. Privacy-as-trust, 
like other social theories of privacy, recognizes that privacy exists post-
disclosure and provides judges with clear, easy-to-apply questions to make 
more nuanced decisions. 
Chapter 8 argues that privacy-as-trust forces us to think differently about 
privacy harms. Currently, most scholars and judges see invasions of privacy as 
attacks on the individual. Privacy-as-trust recognizes that because trust is what 
facilitates and regulates information flows, injuries to informa tion p rivacy are 
injuries to the norms of social interaction. This opens up a new avenue for 
protecting personal privacy: a robust tort of breach of confidentiality. 
Traditionally marginalized in American law, the tort is perfectly suited to 
protecting the privacy of previously disclosed information. T his chapter looks 
at one type of cyberharassm ent - nonconsensual pornography or so-called 
revenge porn- as an illustrative case study. 
Chapter 9 steps outside the confines of privacy to show that privacy-as-trust 
can be used as a more general theory of information flows. Using a case study 
of patent law's public use bar, which prevents inventors from securing a patent 
if they have shared their invention with the public more than one yea r prior to 
application, this chapter makes several arguments. Judges today apply some of 
the same rights-based principles discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 to define 
"public" in the public use bar. This has the perverse effect of privileging 
wealthy corporate inven tors because it ignores the unique social determinants 
of information flows among solo entrepreneurs. Privacy-as-trust not only 
addresses that imbalance but also provides a clear, admin istrable, and fair 
way to distinguish public from private inventions. 
Finally, Chapter 10 discusses social robots. Social robots -like Sony's Aibo 
dog or Kaspar, a machine with humanl ike qualities designed by the University 
ofHertfordshire to help children with autism learn how to respond to others-
are machines that interact with humans on a social level. T hey pose special 
legal challenges that traditional understandings of privacy cannot compre-
hend. Social robots are both wonderful and insidious, and their dangers are 
directly related to their benefits: while helping us meet founda tional human 
needs of companionship, friendship, and emotional connectedness, they 
distract us as they sweep in troves of personal data . Plus, as machines with 
humanish tendencies, they elicit more emotional responses than rational 
ones. This makes us vulnerable, especially in a conventional privacy world 
where mere use of a technology product is considered consen t to ongoing data 
collection. Privacy-as-trust explains the dangers of social robots - we are 
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primed to trust them and, as result, eager to share - and suggests ways to 
protect ourselves in the process. 
I conclude by summarizing my argument and suggesting avenues for future 
research. Privacy-as-trust is not about keeping more information private or 
making more information public. Thinking about privacy as a social norm 
based on trust can help individuals protect themselves against invasions of 
privacy. It can also foster disclosure where needed. It fosters productive 
relationships, both commercial and social. And it fosters powerful trust 
norms that could bring us closer to each other and to technology companies 
who act responsibly with our data. If we know that the websites we use respect 
our trust-based disclosure expectations, we may feel comfortable sharing more 
information to enhance our online experiences. We just need a new way of 
thinking about privacy that works for us, not just for data collectors. This book 
offers that opportunity. 
PART I 
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY "PRIVACY"? 
Disclosures, whether to each other or Internet companies, create power 
imbalances. Sharers become vulnerable to their audiences when they 
disclose. A doctrine of information privacy must mitigate that vulnerabil-
ity. If it doesn't, sharing stops. And a society of secret keepers is no society 
at all. 
Developing that doctrine starts with determining what we mean by the 
word "private." This is an essential task. The way we think about privacy, in 
general, helps determine when we can leverage law to protect it. Scholars 
have been trying to conceptualize and frame a legal right to privacy since at 
least 1890, when Samuel Warren and future Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis wrote a now-famous article in the Harvard Law Review. It is hard to 
overstate the impact of their work. Now the most cited law review article of 
all time, it spawned a dynamic and still ongoing debate among lawyers, 
social scientists, and policymakers about what privacy means and how the 
law can protect it. 
Privacy scholarship may be teeming with different conceptions of priv-
acy, but the differences among them mask widespread agreement about 
their rights-based assumptions. And these assumptions are putting privacy at 
risk in the modern world because they inadequately respond to the power 
dynamics inherent in disclosure. My goal for Chapters 1 and 2, then, is 
twofold. First, I will tease out some of the trad itional definitions of privacy 
and show that many of them are just different expressions of the same 
th~me: privacy and society are in tension, the argument goes, because 
pnvacy is about privileging the individual and individual rights over society. 
And, second, I will show that, as reflections of that rights-based theme, these 
conceptualizations of privacy are not well equipped to answer a number of 
modern privacy questions. They are leading us down a path to a world 
where privacy no longer exists. 
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